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ESPIONAGE IN TRANSNATIONAL LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, spies have been defined as "secret agents of a State
sent abroad for the purpose of obtaining clandestinely information in
regard to military or political secrets."' Older authorities have stated
emphatically that the gravamen of espionage is the employment of
disguise or false pretense. 2 Such deception has been the justification
for visiting the severest of penalties upon the captured spy.3
Curiously, however, the employment of spies has not been considered
reprehensible conduct. 4 The refusal to officially acknowledge the
commissioning of a spy operated to relieve the government of any
responsibility either to the offended state or to the secret agent.' As a
result, espionage in the classic sense can be characterized in two
distinct ways: as to the nation, it was an extraterritorial act of state
for which the state was not responsible; as to the agent, it was an
intentional act of deception which rendered him personally and
criminally liable to the offended government.
The industrial revolution of the past century coupled with the
rapid technological advancement of the present have placed great
strains on the definition, as well as on the dual nature, of espionage.
Beginning at least as early as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the
concept of control of information began to weigh heavily in the minds
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1863 (2d rev. ed. 1947); M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO,

559 (1961).
3. W. HALL, supra note 2, at 535 ("the ignominious death of hanging"); H.
HALLECK, supra note 1, at 407 ("an ignominious death").
4. Governments have always been free to accept gratuitous offers of inother
nation's secrets, even though the informant was compensated. Nineteenth century
authorities, however, divided over whether a nation could legitimately encourage
an individual to commit the odious act of espionage. H. HALLECK, supra note 1,
at 409 (referring to the issue as a "question of ethics"). Both Hall and Oppenheim
unqualifiedly state that the employment of spies is legitimate. W. HALL, supra
note 2, at 535; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 511.
5. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 511.
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

of those responsible for national security. Count Bismark took the
position that an English ballonist was triable as a spy because he
"crossed our outposts and positions in a manner which was beyond
the control of the outposts, possibly with a view to make use of the
information thus gained, to our prejudice." 6 The Russian Government
took a similar view in 1904. It stated its intention to regard neutral
news correspondents as spies should they "communicate war news to

the enemy by means of improved apparatus not yet provided for by
existing conventions" and to seize "as lawful prize" any vessel
operating within the zone of military operations that was provided
with wireless apparatus. 7 These pronouncements make clear that the
essence of spying is not false pretense, but simply unauthorized
disclosure. Consequently, the concern for inability to control the flow
of information has taken precedence over protection against deception
as the principal concern of modern states.
This change in the way governments view espionage has had three
demonstrable effects on the classic categorization. First, the principalagent relationship has become irrelevant. At one extreme, espionage is
not necessarily an act of state at all, but may be the independent,
gratuitous act of an individual. At the other extreme, espionage may
be so intimately related to a normal state activity that it can be viewed
entirely as the act of the nation.' Secondly, the requirement of
scienter has been broadened and to some extent changed. The classic
intent to collect for the purpose of delivery has been severed into two
distinct scienter requirements. Each may satisfy the definition of
espionage so that collection and dissemination are independently
covered. In addition, a new, rather ill-defined scienter has emerged
which states apply to each other and may apply to individuals as well.
It resembles a presumption of intent and is related to the state's
inability to control fully the flow of information. For example, the
neutral news correspondent in 1904 was to be treated like a spy
because he was beyond the control of Russian forces and capable of
relaying vital information to the Japanese. Finally, in a limited sense
the state has become accountable for its espionage activity not only to
the other state but also to its agent and perhaps to third parties as
well. In many situations it is no longer possible for the nation engaged
in espionage to deny the existence of its spy. The downing of the U-2
6.

W. HALL, supra note 2, at 536.

7. 7 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-34 (1906).
The Prussian and Russian positions were criticized severely by both scholars and
governments of the period. See, e.g., W. HALL, supra note 2, at 536-37; 7 J.
MOORE, supra, at 234.
8. An obvious example is the "spy satellite."
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aircraft piloted by Francis Powers is such an illustration.9 In these
situations both nations involved must abandon the traditional practice
of international law that was founded on a policy of nonrecognition.
The nation commissioning the spy may face grave diplomatic
repercussions as a result of the undeniable espionage. On the other
hand, the nation being spied on has little customary international
practice to guide its reaction to the unfriendly act of another state.
While international law has been noticeably remiss in solving the
conceptual problem of espionage, municipal law has in large measure
filled that void. Modern legislation is based on the need to protect
vital security information from intentional compromise. Deception is
conspicuously absent as an element of the crime, and the scienter
requirement is sufficiently broad to exclude agency as a necessary
prerequisite to successful prosecution. 10 Moreover, in the last 50
years espionage prosecutions have given states the opportunity to
weigh the national security interests reflected in local espionage
statutes against other competing social values. The result of this
municipal activity has been the development of a stable body of law
and practice that reflects an accommodation between the needs of
national security and other deep-seated values.
International law, in comparison, has not undergone such a
development. Antiquated rules remain rigid. A distinction is drawn
between peacetime espionage and wartime spying. While espionage
between belligerents is an accepted part of the law of war, espionage
in time of peace is best described as unrecognized. Modern relationships and technology, however, have forced the international system
to abandon its policy of nonrecognition of peacetime spying.
Executive action has proved to be the primary vehicle through which
nations are now adjusting themselves to the important role that
espionage plays in international relations. States, through their
executives, have used municipal law as the foundation upon which to
structure their response to problems unsolved by international law.
Executive action is establishing the degree and the extent of
responsibility that states will assume as a result of their extraterritorial
activity. In short, precedents are being created that on the one hand
recognize espionage as a permissible state activity in time of peace and
on the other set bounds to the conduct of espionage. In the following

9. See generally Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT'L

L. 836 (1960).
10. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 833 (1946). Compare Articles of War, art. 82, 39 Stat. 619, 633 with 18

U.S.C. § § 793-94 (1970).
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discussion Part II will outline the existing rules of international law

and indicate some of the developments that are currently taking place.
Part III will then explore municipal legislation, judicial interpretations
and executive prerogatives, principally of the United States, with a

view toward understanding the role that local law is playing in this
development.
II.

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ESPIONAGE

A.

The Law of War

The right of belligerents to employ spies has been recognized since
ancient times " and is accepted today as a legitimate "ruse of war."12
Consequently, the belligerent who employs spies does not violate the
law of war, 13 and members of the belligerent army or government
may not be prosecuted as war criminals for the employment of
espionage agents. "4 No distinction is drawn between the use of
civilians, of whatever nationality, or of military personnel. Governments may engage sympathetic civilians of the opposing belligerent as
spies even though such conduct on their part may be treasonous.,s
Moreover, the conduct of the spies themselves is not violative of the
law of war, although such conduct may contravene the municipal law
or the law applicable to the armed forces of the opposing belligerent. 16 Thus, both the espionage agent, as well as his principal,
engage in an accepted mode of warfare consonant with the law of war.

11. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs, Book III, Ch. IV, § xviii, at
655 (F. Kelsey transl., Oxford University Press ed. 1925).
12. H. HALLECK, supra note 1, at 406; Baxter, So-Called 'Underprivileged
Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas,and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 330
(1951). Oppenheim distinguishes espionage from other ruses of war and states
that the acceptance of spying arises out of the military necessity to acquire
information in order to wage war. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 196.
13. W. HALL, supra note 2, at 535; H. HALLECK, supra note 1, at 406; 2 L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 197.
14. Trial of Skorzeny, 9 War Crimes Reports 90 (1949).
15. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 197, 313. See also Baxter, supra note
12; Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the
Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65 (1964).

16. Baxter, supra note 12, at 332; McKinney, Spies and Traitors, 12 ILL. L.
REV. 591, 599 (1918). Contra, 3 C. HYDE, supra note 2, at 1865; cf. Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) noted in Hyde, Aspects of the Saboteur Cases, 37 AM.
J. INT'L L. 88 (1943); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 314.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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Although there is no restriction on the type of agent that a
belligerent may employ, international law differentiates between two
classes of agents for purposes of treatment upon capture. A
"belligerent spy" is an officer or soldier of a hostile army who
clandestinely obtains or seeks to obtain information within the zone
of military operations 17 for the use of his army. 18 A "non-belligerent
spy" is either a civilian agent of a belligerent state secretly operating
anywhere, or a military spy secretly operating within the interior of

the opposing belligerent nation. 19
A captured belligerent spy is denied prisoner-of-war (POW)
status. 10 The penalty exacted for being captured is usually death,
although such severity is not required by international law. 21 Article
30 of the Hague Regulations requires that captured spies be tried
before sentence is executed. It is questionable, however, whether the

17. The "zone of operations" is the phrase used in article 29 of the Hague
Regulations to distinguish the theater of war from the interior of the belligerent
nation. This distinction has never been defined with any precision and under
modern warfare probably serves no useful function. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1 (1942) (distinction not mentioned although military spies and saboteurs were
captured in Chicago and New York); United States ex. rel. Wessels v. McDougal,
265 F. 754, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1920) (New York City defined to be within the
"zone of operations" during World War I); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO,
supra note 2, at 559; Baxter, supra note 12, at 332.
18.

HAGUE REGULATIONS, art. 29.

19. See Koessler, The International Law on the Punishment of Belligerent
Spies: A Legal Paradox, 5 CRim. L. REV. 21 (1958); McKinney, supra note 16, at
591. No attempt is made to categorize the various types of belligerents other than
spies. Of course, for example, a single individual may be both a spy and a guerrilla.
Moreover, each of the classifications may have independent relevance under the
rules of war. See generally Baxter, supra note 12. Apart from the two
classifications of wartime spies, municipal law customarily treats conduct
consisting of passing military information to the enemy under a variety of

different labels:
a) espionage under local civil statutes;
b) espionage under the rules of the army;
c) collaboration with the enemy;
d) war-treason, i.e. passing legally acquired information to the enemy; and,

e) treason.
The above list is not intended to be complete, but it is representative.
20. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 559; cf. Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
21. W. HALL, supra note 2, at 535; H. HALLECK, supra note 1, at 407;
Koessler, supra note 19, at 26.
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trial must be a normal judicial proceeding. 22 Resort to special military
commissions rather that courts-martial is not infrequent and, in fact,
may be the rule. 23 In any event, no indictment is necessary 24 and
trial proceedings are summary in nature. 25 The execution of an
alleged spy without trial, however, subjects the captor to liability as a
war criminal. 26
Three defenses are available to a charge of belligerent espionage
under the law of war. First, an accused may plead as a matter of fact
that he was not collecting or seeking to collect information for use by
another state. Secondly, since deception is still the essence of wartime
espionage, proof that a military soldier was in uniform or identifiable
as an enemy is a complete defense and requires that the captor treat
the captive as a POW."
Finally, the law of war requires that the
belligerent spy be caught in an act of espionage as a condition to his

22. Some authorities contend that a judicial determination of the fact of
espionage is required. E.g., M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at
560. Other authorities argue that an administrative determination satisfies the
requirement. E.g., McKinney, supra note 16, at 602-03.
23. Military commissions had their origin in boards of officers composed to
hear cases involving violations of the common law of war over which a general
court-martial might or might not have jurisdiction. Halleck, Military Espionage; 5
AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 597 n.* (1911) (reference is made to the footnote authored
by the editor, G. Davis). Major Andr4, for example, was tried before a military
commission authorized by Washington notwithstanding court-martial jurisdiction
over spies. Morgan, Court-MartialJurisdiction over Non-Military Persons Under
the Articles of War, 4 MINN. L. REV. 79, 107 n.101 (1919). President Roosevelt
also empaneled a military commission to hear the saboteur cases in 1942 although
court-martial jurisdiction existed. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 & n.9-10
(1942). See generally Cohen, Espionage and Immunity-Some Recent Problems
and Developments, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 404, 405 (1948).

24. McKinney, supra note 16, at 596.
25. Koessler, supra note 19, at 25; McKinney, supra note 16, at 596. One
writer has said of German practice during World War II that little more than prima
facie proof was required for even a capital decision. Cohen, supra note 23, at 405.
See also note 105 infra and accompanying text.
26. Trial of Rohde, 5 War Crimes Reports 54 (1946); Trial of Sandrock, 1
War Crimes Reports 35 (1945).
27. W. HALL, supra note 2, at 535. Most of the classic authorities were
careful to distinguish espionage from scouting and dispatch-bearing. The scout
and the spy perform similar functions within the zone of military operations and
are distinguishable only by the disguise practiced by the latter. H. HALLECK,
supra note 1, at 406-07; 2 L. OPPENMEIM,supra note 1, at 197; Halleck, supra
note 23, at 598 (discussion relative to the case of Major Andre).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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loss of POW status. 28 Article 31 of the Hague Regulations reflects this

exception and provides that a belligerent spy captured after rejoining
his army must be treated as a POW.
A captured non-belligerent spy is likewise denied POW status. If a
civilian agent is captured within the theater of war, the same rules are
applied as in the case of a belligerent spy except that the only defense
permitted is one on the factual merits. 2 9 The civilian spy obtains no

immunity from identification or by rejoining his forces. This result is
justified, according to some authorities, because a military spy must
return to his unit within a rather limited time. A civilian, with no duty
to report, is a greater danger to the belligerent army and compels the
use of a more stringent deterrent. 1o
A non-belligerent spy operating within the interior of an opposing
state is not punishable under the law of war. 31 His activity constitutes
a violation of municipal law which is not recognized under international law. 32 An enemy agent captured in the interior has committed
a true crime and must be prosecuted under the applicable local law. In
the United States, for example, he may be punished only after
indictment, jury trial and, if appropriate, appellate review. 3 It should
be observed, however, that Ex parte Quirin34 casts doubt on the
continuing validity of this rule. In Quirin, German soldiers were
captured in Chicago and New York while out of uniform and engaged
in sabotage and espionage. The place of capture was not considered in
determining the prisoners' status, although the law of war was chosen

28. This result has been justified on two grounds. First, proving the facts after
the spy has rejoined his army is often very difficult. Secondly, since spying is a

"ruse of war," which the imposition of a severe penalty is designed to deter, once

the act is complete the need for deterrence has passed. See Baxter, supra note 12,
at 331.
29. McKinney, supra note 16, at 601. Professor Baxter argues that article 31
of the Hague Regulations applies to civilian as well as to military spies. That is to
say that any spy caught after rejoining his forces is immune from prosecution.
Baxter, supra note 12, at 331-32.
30. McKinney, supra note 16, at 602. Professor McKinney also argues that
since a civilian spy has no army to rejoin, article 31 can have no application. Id.

31. The classic rationale for this rule is that spying outside the zone of
operations does not pose an immediate threat to military operations. McKinney,
supra note 16, at 606.
32. Baxter, supra note 12, at 332; McKinney, supra note 16, at 605-06.
33. E.g., United States v. Molzahn, 135 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 774 (1943).
34. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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as the applicable law. While the belligerent characterization is
supported by the fact that the soldiers were on a sabotage mission, the
Court's loose application of belligerency status to the espionage charge
has been heavily criticized. s
For the most part, the law of espionage in time of war has been
codified in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. 11 Articles 29
and 30 define the belligerent spy and provide for trial upon capture.
Article 31 establishes immunity upon an agent's successful rejoining of

his forces. Article 24 provides that ruses of war are permissible and, by
implication, covers espionage. The Hague Regulations are important to
this study for two reasons. First, they serve to crystallize the law of
espionage in its outmoded form. The Regulations retain both the
agency and secrecy definitional bases and, by so doing, they fail to
satisfy the needs of security even in light of the technology available
at the time of their adoption. For example, the 1899 Regulations
exempted ballonists from the definition of spy. 37 Intent to disseminate information to the enemy is absent from many serious threats to
military security. The Regulations leave to the ingenuity of active
belligerents the task of protecting themselves against unauthorized
disclosures by persons or instrumentalities over which they have
minimal or no control. Consequently, the Regulations do not provide
an effective framework within which belligerents may achieve even
minimal security, nor do they provide effective checks and balances
against excesses in the name of military necessity. Secondly, the
Regulations preserve a theoretical inconsistency. On the one hand, a
belligerent state is not liable for the employment of spies; on the
other, the agent is subjected to severe penalties for engaging in a
lawful activity of his principal. It is clear that a belligerent spy is not
being "punished" in the sense that a criminal is punished for violation
of a municipal code. 38 Harshness is, nevertheless, characteristic of the
sanctions employed. The severity of the treatment has been justified
on a number of grounds, all of which ultimately rest on the danger
posed by the spy. Loss of POW status or execution has been justified
as being a deterrent, " a rule of combat, an act of self-defense or

35. E.g., Baxter, supra note 12, at 331 & n.3.
36. See generally Baxter, supra note 12, at 329-32.
37. HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1899, art. 29.
38. Baxter, supra note 12, at 332; MeKinney, supra note 16, at 600; see 3 C.
HYDE, supra note 2, at 1864-65.
39. "Spies are punished, not as violators of the laws of war, but to render that
method of obtaining information as dangerous, difficult, and ineffective as
Vol. 5-No. 2
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simply a penalty for being caught.4 0 In rebuttal, critics have pointed
to the inconsistent immunity provision that rewards the successful spy
and dilutes the deterrent effect of the rule, to the travesty of justice in
meting out punishment for lawful conduct, and to the inconsistency
of the rule that distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate acts
of war and not between more or less dangerous forms of belligerency. 4 1
Professor Baxter has, in a sense, harmonized these inconsistencies. 42 In his view the law of war establishes three, not two,
classifications of belligerent conduct: conduct that is illegitimate and
for which offenders are punished; conduct that is legitimate and for
which belligerents are protected upon capture as POW's; and conduct
that is legitimate but for which the law of war affords no or little
protection. At first glance, Professor Baxter's view seems to define
away the contradictions without really solving the underlying disjuncture.4" Certainly, the spy to be shot at dawn receives little comfort
from the knowledge that he has acted lawfully but that the rules of
war were not designed to protect his legitimate conduct. Professor
Baxter's view, however, does provide a means of escape from the
legal-illegal dichotomy. At present, the rhetoric of legality obfuscates
rational solution of how to provide belligerents with meaningful tools
to secure sensitive information. "Legal" conduct on the part of a
potential security violator is taken to mean that the law of war does
not permit internationally recognized countermeasures. The belligerent is left to his own devices, which may be cruel, ineffective or
both, and, ipso facto, "illegal."
For example, a belligerent cannot permit its security to be
breached by a foreign newsman, yet only three solutions are now
available. "1 The belligerent could brand the newsman as a spy under
international law and treat him accordingly. Such a course of action
would result in serious international repercussions because the

possible."

DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,

para. 77

(FM 27-10, July 1956). See also M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 2,
at 559.
40. McKinney, supra note 16, at 600.
41. Koessler, supra note 19, at 29-30.
42. See generally Baxter, supra note 12, at 332-33.

43. See M.McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 554-55.
44. The German Government during the Nazi era used each of the three
methods discussed, together with informal pressure, as a method of controlling
the content and flow of information from foreign newsmen to their home offices.
E. BRAMSTED, GOEBBELS AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA
1925-1945, at 122 (1965).
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newsman is not a "secret agent." 45 Indeed, members of the
belligerent government might well run the risk of being personally
liable as war criminals. 46 The second alternative open to the
belligerent would be to try the correspondent as a violator of
municipal or military law. This may be the most attractive solution,
since prosecution and punishment for violation of local law serve both
as a deterrent and as a "legal" justification for the countermeasure.
This solution is not entirely satisfactory, however, since the trial and
punishment of a neutral non-belligerent may still give rise to
prosecution of the state officials as war criminals, even when
municipal law has been scrupulously followed. Moreover, since the
dissemination of "news" is not necessarily accompanied by the
specific intent to aid the enemy, a conviction under municipal
espionage statutes may not be possible. Prosecution under a less severe
municipal law may not be satisfactory, since conviction on a minor
charge will not serve as an effective deterrent to breaches of national
security. Even though local security needs are met, international
repercussions may result from the punishment of a correspondent
whose conduct was at most merely negligent. 47 The third option,
expulsion, while curing international difficulties, leaves the needs of
national security largely unsatisfied. Expulsion from the country will
not serve as a deterrent to future abuse. Moreover, the belligerent may
risk even greater harm by releasing an individual with information not
yet stale. The real problem with the newsman who stumbles across
sensitive information is not whether he is acting legally or even
whether the belligerent may legally take action against him. Rather, it
is how to minimize the danger to the belligerent and at the same time
minimize the inconvenience to the journalist. The law of war provides
no guidance in this very simple situation.
The utility of Professor Baxter's view in providing an escape from
the fixation on legality is that the classification system established by
the law of war is based on the degree of privilege associated with
particular conduct. A captured infantryman is privileged by classification as a POW. A captured spy, excluding the belligerent who has
successfully rejoined his forces, is not entitled to the POW classification. However, the spy is not without any privilege: he must be tried

45. E.g., the British protested the German action against the English ballonist
in 1870. 7 J. MOORE, supra note 7, at 233-34.
46. See cases cited supra note 26.

47. E.g., both the British and United States Governments reserved their rights
to freedom of the seas as neutrals in the Russo-Japanese War. 7 J. MOORE,
supra note 7, at 233-34.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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before sentence is executed. Once it is recognized that the degree of
privilege associated with any particular breach of security can be
tailored to the needs of states at war without jeopardizing other legal
classifications, the way is opened to work out the solution to any
security problem in realistic terms. Moreover, the existing deficiencies
in definition, as well as the inconsistencies within the rules, may be
clarified without any damage to national security. At present, the
rules of espionage, under the law of war in general and the Hague
Regulations in particular, are virtually useless either as tools to secure
state secrets or as a means to preserve minimal human rights where
sensitive information is involved. What is urged does not compel a
framework of rules emphasizing either state security or humane
treatment for those who have breached security, but a flexible
structure of classifications adopted after rational consideration of the
needs of the international system.
B.

The Law of Peace

While espionage has a time-honored place in the law of war, the
same cannot be said for the law of peace. The authorities differ over

whether espionage is even recognized under international law and lines
are sharply drawn over whether espionage is a delict. 48 As a practical
matter, the question has arisen rarely in the past. A government had
only to deny officially any connection with a captured agent in order
to avoid international consequences, even if legal recourse were
available to the aggrieved nation. So far as the spy was concerned,
with no state willing to defend him, he was a violator of municipal law
and was tried and punished accordingly. 41 Consequently, the practice
has developed to treat espionage in time of peace as a problem of
municipal law. Until quite recently, international law only defined a
spy so and probably recognized that a state that directed an espionage

48. See generally

ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(R. Stanger ed. 1962). In recent years, Professor Stone has been the leading
defender of espionage as conduct not violative of the law of peace. J. STONE,
LEGAL CONTROL

OF INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICT

563 (1954). However,

the weight of authority supports the position that espionage is an unfriendly act
incompatible with the underlying premise of international law of peace that
nations respect the territorial integrity of sister states. E.g., Baxter, supra note 12,
at 329.

49. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 862.
50. Note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
Spring, 1972
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campaign against another nation had committed an unfriendly act. 5,
Customary international rules governing the conduct of states in the
aftermath of the discovery of espionage are few. Beyond the
observation that espionage does not justify a military attack,
international law offers little guidance. Protest and denial seem to
remain the most accepted ritual. 52 Espionage and related activities by
accredited diplomats or members of their staff is also the subject of an
occasional exchange of notes between governments. 53 Since an
accredited diplomat cannot be prosecuted under municipal law, the
normal practice is to declare the individual persona non grata and
demand recall. "' Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the
espionage, however, no particular response is compelled. Canada took
the unusual step of withdrawing the head of its mission to the
U.S.S.R. in the aftermath of the defection of a cipher clerk who
uncovered a "spy ring" directed by Soviet embassy personnel. 5. Yet
the United States only protested the "bugging" of its Moscow
embassy building. 56 While diplomatic practice demonstrates that
consequences in fact flow from the discovery of espionage, a good
deal of uncertainty remains. The law of peace seems to be settled in
only one situation: a secret agent captured within the interior of
another state, under circumstances uncomplicated by a separate

51. See generally Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in
Internal Affairs in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3

(R. Stanger ed. 1962).
52. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 511. Variations on the same theme are
also popular. For example, the initial United States response to the Soviet
announcement following the downing of the U-2 was to deny espionage and to
claim that a weather plane may have strayed across the border. The Soviets also
have complained of numerous border violations by American military aircraft in
Eastern Europe. The popular American response is that the pilot lost his bearings.
For a review of United States efforts to secure international adjudication of the
more serious aerial incidents before the International Court of Justice see Jessup,
The Development of a United States Approach Toward the InternationalCourt of

Justice, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6-11 (1971). In the case of territorial
waters or airspace violation, an apology is also customary. E.g., N.Y. Times, Dec.
15, 1960, at 18, col. 6 (Soviet apology to Finland for unintentional violation of
airspace).
53. See generally Cohen, supra note 23.
54. E.g., within the past year Great Britain has expelled a large number of
Soviet embassy and consular officials for alleged espionage. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1971, at 2, col. 8. See also Cohen, supra note 23, at 28.
55. The Canadian incident is explored in depth in Cohen, supra note 23.
56. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1964, at 1, col. 2.
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violation of international law, gives rise to an exchange of notes, a
protest and a denial.
International repercussions following recent espionage incidents
indicate that the law of peace is in a developmental phase. The classic
tradition of refusing to acknowledge espionage activity is no longer
available in many situations. In an effort to alleviate the difficulty
posed by this problem, states have made an almost conscious effort to
avoid a solution in terms of espionage law. The felt necessity to spy on
sister states and the equally felt necessity to screen this activity from
public view as much as possible have led nations to characterize the
problem in terms of other areas of international law. In particular, the
law of the sea, air law, and the nascent space law have been called
upon to solve problems only tangentially relevant to those disciplines. 11 For example, whether a trawler equipped to intercept
radio transmissions and proceeding at very low speed is entitled to
innocent passage is not really a question properly asked under the law
of the sea. 8 States nevertheless succeed in shunning the espionage
label by pursuing a solution nominally within the law of the sea. 11 In
this fashion, states may avoid the direct discussion of espionage, which
may constitute a delict. 60 The spying state is compelled to justify the
innocence of its passage and the aggrieved state minimizes the risk that
it will be estopped from raising the issue by its own espionage that is
conducted in a different manner. This is not to say that the law of the
sea or other disciplines have no relevance in a particular case. In many
situations, the best solution may continue to be provided by the rules

of a related area of law. Since the law of espionage is undeveloped,

57. See, e.g., Lissitzyn, Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47
Incidents, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 135 (1962); Rubin, Some LegalImplicationsof the
Pueblo Incident, 18 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 961 (1969).

58. Cf. Rubin, supra note 57, at 968.
59. E.g., the Pueblo incident was treated by the states involved as a maritime
problem. See generally Rubin, supra note 57. Similarly, the U.N. deliberations

following the U-2 incident were couched in terms of territorial sovereignty over
airspace. See Wright, supra note 9.
60. States are noticeably reluctant to allege a delict on the basis of espionage
activity. For example, although Canada withdrew the head of its mission to the
Soviet Union in 1948, the Canadian Government did not charge the U.S.S.R. with
a delict. See Cohen, supra note 23, at 408. Likewise, Russia did not charge the
United States with a delict involving espionage in the wake of the U-2 incident.
The Soviets, however, did allege a delict for violation of its airspace. See generally
Wright, supra note 9. The North Koreans officially did not allege misconduct
involving espionage by the U.S.S. Pueblo but justified its actions on the basis of a
territorial waters intrusion. See generally Rubin, supra note 57.
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however, and the little that exists is tied to an archaic theoretical
foundation, the search for the best response to meet the needs of the
international community is hampered by avoiding the issue.
Within the past 25 years, several major incidents have occurred
that illuminate the theoretical deficiencies inherent in the traditional
approach. 61 In each instance, the international community was
compelled to react to espionage as a state activity. In itself, this is a
major advance and may have interred the agency doctrine in a
well-deserved grave. Since many nations officially have been recognized as spies in their own right, the first step has been made in
reaching a rational accommodation between the conflicting goals of
obtaining and protecting sensitive information. Moreover, in the
United Nations deliberations following the downing of the U-2, the
United States not only admitted its espionage but also defended its
conduct on the basis of the past Soviet practice of employing secret
agents and asserted that the United States had a duty toward the
"free world" to spy on the U.S.S.R. 6 2 Significantly, the Russians
did not challenge this defense directly. Instead, they attacked the
American position collaterally. The Soviets distinguished traditional
espionage from an overflight and defended their response as an act
of self-defense against United States aggression on the grounds that
even a single plane was capable of carrying weapons of great
destructiveness. 63 Thus, the United States took a firm position that
states not only spy but also have a responsibility to spy in time of
peace, and the Soviet Union did not contest the issue.
While official reaction to a known practice on one occasion may
not be significant, such recognition acquires relevance in the light of
other developments. The extreme Canadian response noted above and
the negotiations surrounding the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo suggest
that the law of peace now recognizes espionage as state conduct that,
in some circumstances, gives rise to international responsibilities.
Official response to state espionage does not mean that nations now
have a recognized right to spy. Nonetheless, the attempt to resolve
questions of espionage within the specific context of the law of the
sea and other related disciplines, together with state practices
exemplified by the aftermath of the U-2 incident, lends support to the
argument that nations are reacting to espionage activity on the basis of
permissible response to given types of spying rather than on the basis
of the legality or illegality of espionage per se. In the U-2
61. The incidents of major importance have been the Canadian discovery, the
U-2, the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo, and the spy exchanges.
62. See Wright, supra note 9, at 836-44.
63. See Wright, supra note 9, at 840.
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deliberations, no party seriously questioned the right to destroy an
intruding aircraft or to try a captured agent under municipal law. The
essence of the United States position was that espionage is state
conduct demanded by the needs of Western security and that
overflight by an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft was not an act of
aggression. The Soviet response was not in terms of the legality of
espionage, but rather that aerial espionage was especially dangerous to
world order since armed and unarmed aircraft were indistinguishable
on radar. With the announcement by President Kennedy that such
flights would not be resumed, 64 the United States apparently
conceded the issue. Moreover, the orbiting of reconnaissance satellites
by both nations provides an effective substitute that serves national
security needs and, for the present time at least, is consonant with
world order. 65 The U-2 incident and its aftermath, then, illustrate
that international law may be restructuring the rules relating to
espionage on the degree of toleration and the type of permissible
response to particular conduct.
The international law of extradition as now practiced further
supports this conclusion. Like treason and sedition, espionage has
generally been considered a "political offense" and non-extraditable. 66 Since World War II and the onset of the "Cold War," however,
this customary rule of international law has been strained severely.
Extradition and deportation are used increasingly as executive tools to
further the needs of bloc security policy concerning sensitive
information. An illustrative example is provided by the Soblen case.
Jack Soblen was a Soviet agent who conspired to penetrate the United
States Office of Strategic Services and obtain secret information. He
was convicted under the United States espionage laws and sentenced
to prison, 67 but escaped to Israel. The Israeli Government ordered
that he be deported to the United States for illegal entry and released
him to the custody of American officials. En route to New York, he
managed to slash his wrists, thereby necessitating hospitalization in
London where he requested political asylum. After repeated "representations" by the United States Government urging that Soblen be
deported, his request was denied. When the Home Secretary ordered

64. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1961, at 1, col. 8.
65. Cf. Falk, Space Espionage and World Order: A Consideration of the
Samos-Midas Program in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 45 (R. Stanger ed. 1962).
66. See generally Garcia-Mora, supra note 15.
67. United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.

944 (1962).
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deportation, the English courts refused to review the order despite
precedents that would have permitted the courts to deny deportation
on the grounds that it was a subterfuge to avoid the "political
offense" exception to extradition. 68
Western nations generally refuse extradition to Communist bloc
countries, although extradition or deportation is more likely when the
request originates from another Western state. Similar practices are
implemented by treaty provision among Warsaw Pact countries. 69 The
changing needs of international security have altered the practice, if
not in fact changed the international law, of extradition of espionage
agents. The emerging pattern is not based on the classic rationale for
denying extradition in the case of political offenders. Extradition no
longer is denied simply because the individual has committed an act
directed against the security of another state. Instead, the need to
safeguard the security of a group of nations justifies the abandonment
of the political offense exception as a defense against extradition or
compels the use of the defense against the demand for extradition
from a non-bloc state. The privileged status created by international
law is not itself attacked as unjustified or illegal. A new and different
set of criteria related to interstate security needs, however, now
govern the application of the political offense exception. The current
practic,. concerning extradition and deportation of spies is an
affirmation of interstate responsibility for the protection of mutual confidences. The executive practice of trading spies within the camp, while
restricting their flow across the ideological barrier, serves the needs of
the current world situation by insuring that hostile agents with
sensitive information do not escape detention within the bloc.
The development of new international law concerning espionage
practices has been extended to the treatment accorded captured
agents. The growing official acceptance of espionage as a state activity
has opened the door for nations to assume some responsibility
toward their agents that have been captured abroad. Within the past
several years, a few encouraging examples of the exchange of spies
between the East and the West have taken place. 1o As long as states
were able to deny effectively their conduct of espionage such
exchanges were unlikely. The containment policy underlying current

68. Rex v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Sarno, [1916] 2 K.B. 742.
In a pathetic finale, Soblen committed suicide while still in England.
69. See generally KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF
LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR POLITICAL ENDS 365-69 & n.30 (1961).

70. The most widely publicized exchange was the 1962 Abel-Powers-Pryor
trade.
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extradition practices may have contributed also to the initiation of
spy exchanges. The bloc practice of containing hostile agents has
buttressed municipal espionage legislation and, in a sense, has given
local law an extraterritorial significance. The result is that international obligations based on joint security needs supplement functions performed previously by local law alone. For example, the
deterrent effect of municipal law is enhanced by the extradition
practices of bloc states. The increased efficacy of municipal legislation
may have been another element that created an atmosphere favorable
to the exchange of captured spies. When the information obtained by
a spy has become stale, his further detention serves the needs of
national security principally as a deterrent. 7 If deterrence is satisfied
otherwise, the agent's exchange for another similarly situated may be
easier to justify.
Executive action has been the significant moving force in the
development of international practice regarding espionage. This
practice represents a clear departure from the pre-existing law of
peace. Some state activity has been abandoned because the interests in
obtaining information do not outweigh the increased danger to
national security and to minimum world order arising out of the
specific conduct. Nonetheless, states have assumed a kind of mutual
responsibility toward the protection of information that is important
to bloc security. Such conduct cannot be explained in terms of an
espionage law that is based on principal-agent relationships and that
only gives effect to the national interest in protecting secrets against
clandestine theft. In contrast to the law of peace, municipal statutes
enacted in the first quarter of this century have provided a framework
within which states have been able to give full play to the demands of
national security. With such a background, executive response to the
problems of international espionage has been couched largely in terms
of the model that reflected the needs of state security rather than in

71. At the conclusion of Rudolf Abel's trial for conspiracy to commit
espionage, the Government urged "a substantial and very strong sentence" to
"serve notice upon the men in the Soviet Union ... that the commission of
espionage in the United States is a hazardous undertaking." J. DONOVAN,
STRANGERS ON A BRIDGE 254-55 (1964) (quoting W.F. Tompkins, Assistant
Attorney General and chief prosecuting attorney). In commenting on the sentence
about to be imposed, Judge Byers noted, inter alia, "Thus the problem will be
seen to present the single question of how the defendant should be dealt with so
that the interests of the United States in the present, and in the foreseeable
future, are to be best served, so far as those interests can be reasonably forecast."
Id. at 256.
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terms of the international model that was not only outdated but also
incomplete. To the extent that current interstate practice represents a
development of the law of peace, municipal law has provided an
important source for the evolution.

III.

MUNICIPAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE POWER

Before the turn of the present century, municipal legislation
relating to espionage was founded on three concepts. The spy was an
agent of another state who practiced his trade in secrecy and whose
conduct was intentional in nature. The essence of the crime was said
to be clandestine activity and statutes were drafted in such
language. 7 Moreover, the agency and scienter requirements were
quite narrow. Municipal law generally required that a spy be an agent
of a foreign power 73 and limited the requisite intent to passing
information injurious to the state. '" Indeed, it is still popular to claim
that the agency and scienter requirements are distinct and that
espionage is distinguishable from treason and sedition on the basis of
the agency relationship. 11
Beginning with the American Civil War, however, the inadequacies
of this municipal foundation became apparent. Telegraphic and
wireless communication, aerial flight and the impact of guerrilla
warfare outlined the inherent weakness of the existing espionage laws
as tools to enforce the needs of national security. 76 By World War I,
the old espionage laws were clearly antiquated and modem rules were
needed. In the United States, the reform occurred in 1917; in Europe,
it occurred somewhat earlier. Most of the nations of the world had
enacted new legislation well before the start of World War II."

72. Espionage legislation prior to 1900 was treated within the framework of
military law. For a survey of early statutes and legislative history see Morgan,
supra note 23, at 107-11. The first American legislation was enacted in 1776 and
the language, "lurking as spies," has persisted to the present day. UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 106.
73. Garcia-Mora, supra note 15, at 81-83.
74. See McKinney, supra note 16, at 592-93.
75. Garcia-Mora, supra note 15, at 79.
76. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 109-10.
77. Garcia-Mora, supra note 15, at 81-83. In the United States and England
the reform came in the form of separate civil statutes. The American statute
is a clear departure from pre-existing law in both language and coverage;
court-martial and military commission jurisdiction is retained, however.
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The principal change was an elimination of the agency requirement.
Whether municipal law has ever required proof of agency per se is
unclear. However, the specific intent to communicate information to
another state was required, and this led to the not unreasonable
assumption that some type of formal relationship existed between the
two parties. Nevertheless, the purpose of municipal law has always
been to protect against the disclosure of classified information
regardless of agency. " The modem statutes perform this function by
differentiating between collection and dissemination, not by incorporating the two. In this way the statutes make very clear that agency
is not an element of espionage. The prohibited activity is collection or
dissemination of sensitive information. 9 The United States statutes
emphasize this point by providing that "reason to believe," as well as
specific intent, is sufficient to establish liability.80 Such a provision is
unnecessary if an agency relationship is at the root of the prohibition.
Even more telling is the statutory provision relating to foreign agents.
Quite apart from the espionage laws, United States statutes provide
that foreign agents must register with the Secretary of State and not
infrequently spies are prosecuted for a violation of both statutes. In
one case the espionage conviction was reversed without disturbing the
conviction under the registration statute;8 1 while in another, the
court was clearly bothered by the paucity of evidence establishing
either intent or agency and resorted to the technical rules of
conspiracy to affirm a conviction.82
Reference to clandestine activity is absent from modem legislation.
The entire thrust of the statutes is aimed at control of the flow of
information relating to the national defense, however collected or
transmitted. Judge Learned Hand specifically rejected the government's contention that deceptive means of acquiring information was
relevant in an espionage prosecution. 8' The test, he said, was whether
the information could be gathered at all, not how it was gathered. 4
78. See, e.g., 7 J. MOORE, supra note 7, at 231-34 (a collection of
espionage statutes principally of the United States).
79. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § § 793-94 (1970). See also Boeckenhaupt v. United
States, 392 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968).
80. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1970). The language "directly or indirectly"
also militates against the requirement of agency.
81. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 833 (1946).
82. United States v. Molzahn, 135 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
774 (1943).
83. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 833 (1946).
84. 151 F.2d at 816.
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The intentional character of espionage activity is the major
delimiting element of the modem statutes. Specific intent is, of
course, covered.85 Mere reason to believe that information is to be
used to the injury of the country or for the benefit of another state is
also sufficient.8 6 The motive for commiting espionage is irrelevant.8 7
Perhaps the most significant modern provision is that the information
need not be injurious to the state from whom it is stolen. A crime is
committed even if the foreign government to be benefited is an ally. 88
Thus, intent to deliver information relating to United States national
security with a view toward benefiting the Soviet Union in its relations
with Japan is covered under the act. 9 Moreover, a spy need not
intend to aid a nation. Assistance given to "any faction or party or
military or naval force within a foreign country" or any representative

thereof will fulfill the statutory requirement. 90 Since the majority of
states also incorporate conspiracy provisions, the scienter requirement
is much enlarged. 91 Consequently, overt acts in furtherance of a
conspiracy may result in liability for the commission of otherwise
lawful activity. 2
Executive prerogatives and responsibilities under the new statutes
are important. Equally important is the executive's power to use both
international law and municipal law as tools to protect information
relating to the national defense. 93 The single most important
responsibility of the American executive is to take the first step to
protect sensitive defense information. 94 Without such a step, the
85. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
889 (1952). See also Grzybowski, The Powers Trial and the 1958 Reform of
Soviet Criminal Law, 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 425, 432-33 (1960) (discussing intent
under the Soviet espionage statutes).
86. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
87. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
88. "[U] nhappily the status of a foreign government may change." 312 U.S.
at 30.
89. 312 U.S. at 30.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (a) (1970).
91. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 794 (c) (1970); see Cross, Official Secrets, 6 THE
LAWYER 31 (Trinity 1963) (criticizing British practice of trying spies under the
conspiracy provision of the Official Secrets Act of 1911).
92. United States v. Lang, 73 F. Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
93. In some situations the executive may elect to prosecute a spy either under
civil law before a court of general jurisdiction or under military law before a
court-martial or a military commission.
94.

No attempt is made to discuss the executive classification of sensitive

information or to examine the degree of protection that is, for example, afforded
"Restricted" as opposed to "Top Secret" information. Indeed, one of the better
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information is public and may be collected or disseminated without
control.9" Moreover, in the United States, at least, only information
relating to the national defense is protected by the espionage laws.96
The question whether a particular piece of information is related to
the national defense is a question of fact, and therefore the public
prosecutor has the power to bring suit regardless of the subject matter.
In this regard, the Supreme Court has specifically held that agricultural statistics might properly be covered by the espionage law.9 7
Initially, the burden is on the government to protect the information
that it deems sensitive.
In the absence of such protection,
information specifically released to the public or information that
"the services have never thought it necessary to withhold" may be
transmitted to a foreign nation without subjecting the sender to
prosecution. 9 The laws and traditions of the United States and most
Western nations do not distinguish between information publicly
available within the nation but nontransferable to foreigners. Con-

sequently, the burden on the government to secure its intelligence
assumes extensive proportions. The Soviet Union and many Eastern
bloc countries do make this distinction, and while the espionage
statutes do not speak in such terms, additional protection is afforded
the state. Moreover, even in the United States certain kinds of
information may be protected independently of the espionage laws.
Particularly in the case of atomic energy, alternative modes of
statutory protection are available.' 00 Thus, in some instances the
executive may be able to choose between alternative means of
prosecution as a method of enforcing state secrecy.

features of modern statutes, which has been carried over from the older models, is
that no distinction is drawn between degrees of sensitivity. While such
classifications may be necessary within the government or military, administration
of a sytem of sanctions based on such a classification scheme would be unduly
burdensome. But see United States v. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
95. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 833 (1946).
96. The British Official Secrets Act of 1911 protects all government
documents and confidences. See Cross, supra note 91.
97. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
98. United States statutes also require that certain geographic areas must be
designated by the President if the area is to fall within the protection of the act.
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1970).
99. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 833 (1946).
100. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
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The Rosenberg case offers an example of just such a choice. The
Rosenbergs were tried for conspiracy to violate the espionage laws.
The prosecution sought the death penalty on the basis of wartime
activity occurring in 1944. Yet the conspiracy, as alleged and proved,
extended through 1950. In 1946 the Atomic Energy Act, which
provided for death only on the recommendation of the jury, was
passed.' 01 By opting for prosecution under the espionage law, the
government successfully avoided putting the question of death to the
jury. Over vigorous dissents by Justices Black, Douglas and Frankfurter, the Supreme Court upheld the government's prerogative to
elect its remedy. 1 02
Ex parte Quirin' 03 offers a similar example, differing only in the
fact that the choice was between municipal and international law.

Eight German soldiers were put ashore by submarine in the early days
of World War II to conduct espionage and sabotage activities in the
interior of the United States. Two of these men were United States
citizens. The day after they were apprehended by the F.B.I., the
President, by proclamation, declared that enemy "subjects, citizens or
residents" committing espionage, sabotage or acts in violation of the
laws of war would be subject to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals.' 04 Moreover, the proclamation established procedural rules
'for the conduct of such military commissions that were at variance
with existing procedures set forth in the Articles of War approved by
Congress.' 05 On a petition for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the President had acted within his powers and
dismissed the petition. As to whether this result is founded on the war
powers or simply on the executive power of the President, the Court's
opinion is unclear. By one construction, Quirin may well establish a
precedent that permits the Chief Executive, under his executive
power, to bypass Congress in punishing offenders of international

101. 42 U.S.C. § § 1810 (b)(2)-(3) (1970).
102. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953) (review of stay of
execution issued by Justice Douglas). The dissenting justices argued that where
two criminal statutes award different penalties for the same conduct, the lesser
penalty should be imposed. Justice Frankfurter vigorously objected-to the idea
that the government should be permitted an election of remedy. "[I] t cannot be
left within the discretion of a prosecutor whether the judge may impose the death
sentence wholly on his own authority or whether he may do so only upon the
recommendation of the jury.... Congress and not the whim of the prosecutor
fixes sentences." 346 U.S. at 306.
103. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
104. Proclamation of the President on 3 July, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101.
105. Compare 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 with Articles of War, arts. 38, 43, 46 & 70.
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law.' 06 In a passage pregnant with implications, the Court noted that
Congress had not undertaken to codify international law, mark its
precise boundaries or enumerate by statute all acts condemned by
international law, but instead had adopted the "system of common
law applied by military tribunals."' 0 7 In any event, the espionage
laws then in force were not a bar to proceedings before the military
commission since Congress had chosen not to limit the jurisdiction of
military tribunals.' 8 The Court also found that the constitutional
guarantees of indictment, jury trial and the like, which had been
thought assured in the case of citizensI 09 did not bar a trial before a
military commission. The Court held that belligerents, even though
citizens, had no constitutional protection against a summary proceed-

ing under the law of war. The Court noted that while some violations
of international law did require the government to respect constitutional guarantees, belligerents were not so privileged.' '
The executive, then, is provided with important options in its legal
battle with espionage agents. In addition to the examples above, the
government may prosecute spies under the conspiracy laws;' ' it
may elect administrative arrest as opposed to criminal process and
thereby obtain important advantages during the investigative stage;' 12
and, in many cases, it may proceed under the espionage or the treason
statutes as it deems fit.'' Until quite recently, the government was
also relieved of an obligation to make certain information available to
a defendant. In United States v. Ebeling,'"' the government
succeeded in keeping secret confidential reports made by a government informer, even though the informer testified during the trial
regarding matter contained in the reports. The government argued

106. The President has always had the power as commander-in-chief to
appoint a military commission to try offenders against the common law of war
even though the offense was covered by an Article of War and triable before a
court-martial.
107. 317 U.S. at 29-30.
108. 50 U.S.C. § 38, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 294 (1970).
109. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1863).
110. 317 U.S. at 37-44.
111. In fact, virtually all espionage prosecutions are for conspiracy. E.g.,
United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Cross, supra note
91 (reporting similar British practices).
112. E.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (54 decision).
113. E.g., United States v. Molzahn, 135 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 774 (1943) (espionage); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947)
(treason).

114. 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944).
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that such documents should not be made available to the defense
unless the report contained information tending to exculpate or aid

the defendant. The trial court privately examined the document and
agreed with the government's position favoring its suppression. On
appeal, the Second Circuit divided over the issue, with the majority
sustaining the trial court. 1 1 5 The dissent argued that only the crucible
of open trial could properly determine the relevance of such evidence:
"The government must choose; either it must leave the transactions in
the obscurity from which a trial will draw them, or it must expose
them fully. Nor does it seem to us possible to draw any line between
documents whose contents bear directly upon criminal transactions,
and those which may be only indirectly relevant."' 1 6 The position of
the dissent was adopted subsequently by the Supreme Court, 1 7
although the application of the new rule is yet to be tested in an
espionage prosecution. If the current rule continues, the government
may find itself on the horns of an uncomfortable dilemma: prosecute
and reveal damaging counterespionage information collateral to its
case or let the spy go free.
The government's ability to protect sensitive information is
qualified in only three respects: first, the government must in some
manner identify and guard its secrets; secondly, it must weigh whether
the further publication of compromised information is in the national
interest before prosecuting at all; and finally, it must weigh the
resulting damage to national security in the release of information
collateral to that already compromised, but not yet public, against the
benefit to be derived from prosecution. The government, however, is
provided with modern legislation founded in theory on the threat to
security. In addition, its interest in protecting its confidences is aided
to some extent by the international community, especially those
nations with whom it shares ideology or defense. On a higher plane,
even the government's potential enemies apparently restrict their own
espionage because of the mutually felt necessity to preserve some
minimum world order.
The classic international law of peace treated espionage as a non-event

and agents as having committed political crimes that were punishable
under municipal law only if the spy were caught and successfully
detained within the jurisdiction of the injured state. Executive action,
which has been modeled after executive conduct in internal affairs, is
now creating a new set of international rules. Incidents involving

115. 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) (2-1 decision, Frank, J., dissenting).
116. 146 F.2d at 259 (Frank, J., dissenting). But see Cross, supra note 91.
117. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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espionage are analyzed on the basis of the threat to national security,
which undoubtedly has always been the case. Executive responses to

such incidents, however, increasingly are framed both in terms of and
as a result of the same identification and weighing processes that are
used in internal affairs. Nations, through their executives, see reflected
in the international sphere the same basic policy conflicts that have
long existed internally. Technology permits nations to exploit
espionage in more varied ways than sending an agent abroad to steal.
Unfortunately, international law has not responded to the changed
circumstances despite the efforts of Germany and Russia to force a
solution at the end of the last century. Current events, however,
indicate that the municipal law solutions and the national practices
that have developed over the past half century are providing a
theoretical framework within which executive initiative is establishing
a new set of rules. Solutions are no longer sought in terms of how to
unmask a thief, but rather in terms of how to both exploit for
national use and contain for national protection the technology of the
industrial and atomic revolutions. The results of this effort not only
appear to create entirely original practice and expectation between
nations, but also seem to have altered the response to more traditional
situations.
Leslie S. Edmondson
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